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ABSTRACT
It has long been believed that international competition
forces domestic finns to behave more competitively. I term this
the imports-as--market-discipline hypothesis. I construct a
simple static oligopoly model and estimate the model using panel
data from Turkish manufacturing firms. The data span the course
of a dramatic trade liberalization. Looking for changes in
price-marginal cost markups as trade policy shifts, I test the
imports-as-market discipline hypothesis. In all five industries
to which the hypothesis is relevant, markups change in the
direction predicted by the theory. These changes are
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1. Introduction
The theory of international trade policy is becoming quite well developed. Myriad
policies, real and imagined, have been investigated in models of perfect competition and,
more recently, in models of imperfect competition. The more recent literature is quite
nicely surveyed (and extended) in Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman's Trade Pohcy and
Market Structure (1989).Econometricstudies of trade policy under imperfect competition,
in contrast to the theoretical investigations, are scarce. It is perhaps telling that Helpman
and Krugman's survey of empirical work in the field does not mention a single econometric
study.
Recent empirical work in trade policy and market structure consists primarily of cali-
brated simulation models. Examples include Avinash Dixit's (1988) study of the United
States automobile industry, Paul Krugman and Richard Baldwin's (1988) study of the
semiconductor market, Alasdair Smith and Anthony Venables' (1988,1989) studies of sev-
eral industries in the United Kingdom, and Dani Rodrik's (1988) study of various Turkish
industries. Although none of these studies ask exactly the same question, they share some
common themes. All of these are studies of trade policy under imperfect competition em-
ploying industry level simulation models. They are calibrated, not estimated. All these
studies examine normative as well as positive consequences of trade policy. Also, all these
studies consider the role government policy might play in altering the game firms play and
are hence studies of strategic trade policies. Finally, they are all prospective. That is, they
evaluate policies that could be, but are not actually, implemented.
I am grateful to Steve Berry, Jim Brander, Tim Bresnahan,AvinashDixit, Rob Feenstra,
Eban Goodstein, Gene Grossman, Jeff Mackie-Mason, Ariel Pakes, Dani Rodrik, Bob Staiger, Jim Tybout,
and Frank Wolak for helpful comments and/or discussions. Also many thanks to to Lili Lui and Janet Nctz
(or research assistance. None of the above bear any blame. I am also grateful to the World Bank which
funded this paper under RP0674-46: Industrial Competition, Productive Efficiency, and their Relation to
Trade Regimes.This paper investigates the effects of trade policy in imperfectly competitive markets,
hut beyond that it deviates from the above group in all the dimensions listed. Econo-
metric estimates are employed to evaluate the positive effects of a trade policy that was
implemented. In many respects, the goal of this paper is much more modest than its
predecessors. The policy studied is quite simple and not especially strategic. The welfare
consequences of the policy are not addressed. I test what Helpman and Flrugman call
"the oldest insight in this area (of trade policy and imperfect competitinn.) This is the
idea that international trade increases competition."1 When faced with intensified inter-
national competition, domestic industries, which may have reaped oligopoly profits in a
protected domestic market, are forced to behave more competitively. This phenomenon
is frequently claimed to be especially relevant in developing countries where the protected
domestic market often will only support a few firms. (See Rodrik (1988) for a discussion.)
I term this phenomenon the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis.
This is a hypothesis about how firms respond to a change in trade policy. As important,
intuitive, and old-fashioned as the hypothesis may be, it appears that it has not been rigor-
ously tested with firm-level data.2 There is, though, an older body of emprirical research,
adopting what is sometimes called the "Structure-Performance-Conduct" paradigm that
addressed the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis. An especially entertaining review
of that literature is found in Richard Caves (1985). Treating profits as directly observable
and concentration ratios as valid measures of market power, that body of literature found
that, "the larger is imports share of domestic sales, the smaller is the effect of the con-
centration of domestic producers on the profits earned by those producers." (Caves, p. 2)
Most of these studies used industry-level data and ran cross-industry regressions, although
some studies used time series.
In contrast to these earlier studies, I adopt the apporach of what has come to be called
the new empirical industrial organization. I estimate a very simple model of the npti-
Theidea certainly isanold one. According to Richard Caves, Jeffrey Frankel, and Ronald Jones
(1990), "'The tariff is the mother of the trusts' was a charge heard often in the United States at the end
of the nineteenth century."
2 Anexception brought to my attention is work in progress by Ann Harrison (2989) looking at the
effects of trade liberalization in the Ivory Coast.
9mizing oligopolistic firm while treating important parameters such as demand elasticities,
the mode of market conduct, and marginal costs as unobservable. Because the imports-
as-market-discipline hypothesis is a hypothesis about firm behavior, testing it carefully
requires firm-level data. This paper asks whether, in a particular instance, the theory is
supported by the data.
The trade policy studied is the large scale removal of import protection in the Turkish
manufacturing sector in 1984. The methodology employed is constructed to accommodate
the idiosyncracies of the available data, and in this case the data consist of detailed plant
level information on inputs and outputs for almost all manufacturing firms in Istanbul,
Turkey from 1983 to 1986. Because the available panel data are broadly representative of
the sort of data available to researchers using manufacturing censuses, the methodology
has applications beyond this particular use. The estimating equation is derived along the
lines of the pioneering work of Mark Roberts (1984) and is also quite similar to estimating
equations recently used by Robert Hall (1988).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review
of the dramatic trade liberalization that Turkey experienced in the early 1980's. This
trade reform provides an excellent experiment for which there is relatively plentiful firm-
level data. Since the availability of data constrains the theory which generates testable
hypotheses, the data are described before any theory is presented. Discussion of the data
constitutes section 3. Section 4 describes the very straightforward theoretical model which
leads to a structural estimating equation. Section 5 discusses several econometric concerns,
and results are presented and evaluated in section 6. Concluding remarks are gathered in
section 7.
2. The Experiment: Trade Liberalization in Turkey
If an index of Turkish economic health had been listed on a major stock exchange at
the close of the 1970's, the shrewd investor would have been sorely tempted to have bet the
farm by selling short. In the very near term, such a hypothetical investor would have done
quite well. In 1980, CNP fell 1.1 percent, inflation was up to 107 percent, and the current
account deficit was 5.5 percent of CNP. Trade policy was a protectionist's dream. The
3headaches that confronted an export producing firm included an over-valued exchange
rate, difficulty obtaining credit, complex rules limiting one's ability to extend credit to
international customers, and administrative difficulty obtaining imported inputs. Even
if import—substituting producers did not receive any protection, potential entrepreneurs
presumably thought twice before embarking on an export producing venture.
Import competing producers, though, did receive tremendous protection from inter-
national competition. Like many countries that placed a heavy emphasis on import—
substitution, Turkey employed an extensive and complicated system of tariffs, taxes and
non-tariff barriers.3 The average tariff in 1981 was estimated at 49 percent (Yagci (1984)).
The general pattern of tariffs was one in which rates were lowest in raw materials and inter-
mediate inputs that were not produced domestically and were highest on finished products
that were produced domestically. Rates on imports from the EEC were slightly lower.
The Turkish system of quotas, import licencing, and foreign exchange regulations vere
(perhaps not accidentally) very complicated. All goods were, in effect, placed on one nf
tlsree lists. Goods on the Liberalized List could be imported freely, but these were mostly
inputs not produced domestically. A second list contained quotas on most other imported
products. Importation of goods not on either list was simply prohibited (hence in effect
creating the third or Prohibited List.) Calculating tariff equivalents to non-tariff barriers
is a well established yet tricky business. Krueger (1974) estimated that for over half of all
products imported, the tariff equivalent was over 100 percent. In any case, there is little
doubt that non-tariff barriers provided domestic producers with considerable additional
protection.
Beginning in 1980, Turkey began a remarkably successful transformation from an in-
ward looking to an outward oriented open economy.4 The first wave of this liberalization
took place in 1980, and these measures were primarily directed at encouraging exports.
Measures included a real devaluation of about 30 percent in 1980 alone, tax rebates to
Adetailed discussionof protection is found in Fahrettin Yagci (1984). Much of the discussionof
pre-liberalization trade policy is drawn from this. Surveys of earlier trade policy and its effects are found
in Anne Krueger (1974).
For a more detailed discussion of this transformation see Aricanli and Rodrik (1990) (especially
the chapter by Baysen and Blitzer) from which much of this discussion is drawn, and Rodrik (1990).
4exporters which rose from 9 to 23 percent and whose base expanded from 61 to 87 percent,
credit subsidies to exporters, arid foreign exchange allocations that allowed the duty-free
import of many intermediate and raw materials used to produce exportables. By 1983,
merchandise exports about doubled. By the end of 1983, the initial burst of export pro-
motion had produced admirable results.
While this initial burst of liberalization was very good for Turkish economic perfor-
mance, the timing is not as welcome for the purposes of this study, since the first year of
available data is 1983. If the export promotion might have been expected to increase the
profits of exporting firms, most of this effect is not going to show up in a data set that
does not include 1980—82. Fortunately (for this study, if not the Turkish economy), the
liberalization of imports came later.
Significant import liberalization measures were announced in December, 1983. The
1984 Import Program significantly reduced both tariff and non-tariff barriers. A new more
liberal system of non-tariff barriers was established. Goods which were no longer on either
of three new lists could now be freely imported. Prohibitive quotas on some narrowly
defined consumer goods remained and these constituted the Prohibited List.5 Another list
consisted of luxury items on which a special levy was placed. The third list, called the
Licence List, covered 28 percent of 1984 imports, and importation of these goods required
a special licence. The Licence List was the most important form of non-tariff protection
for Turkish manufacturing after liberalization, yet it was much less binding and much less
comprehensive than the previous system of non-tariff barriers. Indeed, the Licence List in
1984 covered only 28 percent of imports —amore than twofold decrease.
Along with the removal and reduction of non-tariff barriers, tariffs were reduced to
about 20 percent for most products. In general, industries that were hardest hit by the
removal of NTB's faced the smallest tariff cuts. Table 1 presents the 3-digit ISIC industries
in which, in 1984, Turkey was a net importer and the level of 1984 imports. Non-electrical
machinery (ISIC 382) and industrial chemicals (ISIC 351) are, by an order of magnitude,
This list was graduallyeliminated and by 1985 about the only commodities still on it were
narcoticsand weapons.
5where most imports are.6 Table 2 provides industry-specific information on the estimated
changes in protection. This table is adapted from Baysen and Blitzer. In all but two
industries, ISIC 384 and ISIC 385, protection fell in 1984. In these two industries, the rise
in the tariff level was estimated to more than compensate for the reduction in quantitative
restrictions. Only in non-ferrous metals (ISIC 372) did non-tariff barriers actually increase.
The hroad and dramatic import liberalization of 1984 provides an excellent natural
experiment with which to investigate the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis. Econo-
metric investigations, though, are typically constrained by the availability of data. In the
next section, the available data are described.
3. The Data
The available data are from the Turkish manufacturing census and were collected by
the Turkish State Institute of Statistics. The data are annual observations at the plant
level and cover all plants in the greater Istanbul area from 1983 to 1986. Because the
manufacturing sector is so heavily concentrated around Istanbul, the data provide fairly
comprehensive coverage of Turkish industry. Plants are identified only by an identification
number and if some plants are owned by the same parent firm, this relationship is not in
the data. Henceforth, the terms plant and firm will be used interchangeably. Issues ￿f
intra-firm transfer pricing of inputs and within firm cross-plant collusive pricing of outputs
are not addressed due to the structure of the data.
Table 3 lists the number of firms in each industry and the 1985 6-firm concentration
ratios. Although all industries are comprised of many firms, the six firm concentration
ratio indicates that the size distribution of firms is hardly uniform. \\Thile this ratio says
nothing about firm behavior,, it does provide some preliminary, albeit only suggestive,
evidence that the perfect competition assumption may not be uniformly valid. A caveat
is in order, though. The concentration ratios in Table 3 only indicate what propnrtion of
domesüc output is produced by the biggest six firms. Insofar as international competition
6 Theonly 3-digit manufacturing ISICcodenot in Tables I and 2 for which Turkey was a net
importer is ISIC354— petroleum products. No information about the levels or changes in protection were
available. Also, much of this industry is heavily regulated or owned outright by the govcrnment.
6limits any domestic market power, a high concentration ratio may say very little about
the liberalized open economy industry structure.
Available firm-level data are mostly comprised of detailed information on firm expendi-
tures and the value of output. Since I will be concerned with price-marginal cost mark-ups,
costs which do not vary with the level of output will play no role. Rather I concentrate
the below discussion on inputs that do vary with output.7 On the input side, there is
firm-specific information on the number of production workers and payments to produc-
tion workers, hence giving firm-specific wages. Expenditures on fuel are provided, and
a Turkish manufacturing energy price index is used to yield both price and quantity of
fuel. Expenditures on raw materials and other purchased variable inputs are provided as
is an industry-specific input price index which is used to convert these expenditures to
quantities.
Data on firm-level capital stocks are not provided.8 Although levels of capital are not
available, detailed firm-level information is available on capital investment. While the lack
of data on capital stocks will provide some hurdles (for example, not being able to estimate
a conventional production function), there are reasons to believe that in Turkey annual
expenditures on capital investment may be better measured than the value of the firm's
entire existing capital stock. The cost of capital is assumed to be 7 percent.9
On the output side, data are available on the value of firm output. Sales and inventory
changes are individually available. Price is an industry-specific output price index. Firm-
specific output prices are not available. Because only four years of data are available
and prices are not firm-specific, estimation of industry demand elasticities is infeasible.
This constraint is typically very important in empirical models of the firm, since demand
elasticities play a key role in the oligopolistic firm's behavior.
Avery detailed description of the data isprovided in the Data Appendix.
8 Fora small sub-sample, capital stock data are sporadically available, but this is toospottyto be
of much use.
Setting the cost of capital to 20 percent instead of 7percentdoes not change the qualitative -
results. This is probably because investment, as a share of output, is very small in these industries over
this time period.
7All data were checked for obvious miscodes and these ohservations were discarded.
Finally, the data, excluding the occasional missing observation or miscode, form a balanced
panel. i.e. All firms show up in all years. The information concerning firm entry and exit
inherent in an unbalanced panel is not available. This will presumably induce some sample
selection biases, and these are discussed in the Results section.
In sum, the available data consist of a balanced firm-level panel spanning 1983 to 1986.
Input quantities are firm-specific and quite comprehensive. The important exception to
this is capital stock, as only its flow, investment, is measured. Input prices are industry-
specific with the exception of wages which are firm-specific. Firm-specific output quantities
are implicitly provided, but output price is industry-, not firm-, specific. Keeping in
mind the constraints and opportunities this data set implies, I now turn to deriving a
simple structural oligopoly model that generates an estimable test of the imports-as-market
discipline hypothesis.
4. Some Theory
When modelling how trade policy and domestic market structure interact in a domestic
homogenous good industry, there are many cases to consider.'° Trade policy may take the
form of tariffs or quotas. An imperfectly competitive domestic market structure may
be either monopolistic or oligopolistic. If it is oligopolistic, the domestic firms might play
either non-cooperatively or collusively. If they play non-cooperatively, what is the strategic
variable? Domestic firms may produce with increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to
scale. The foreign firm(s) may produce a perfect or imperfect substitute good. All these
cases, and others, are summarized by Helpman and Krugman.
With so many possible theoretical permutations, it is striking that a tariff or a quota
will, in almost every case, increase price-marginal cost markups.1' Furthermore, except
15 Throughout,I assume the domestic industry produces a homogenous good. This is consistent
with only observing a domestic industry-wide output price. Trade policy and market structure with
differentiated products raises yet more issues. These are summarized in Helpman (1990). While an
empirical test of some of the issues that arise in the case of domestic firms producing differentiated
products would be welcome, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
There is one case in which liberalization leads to the oligopolists taking the hit in profits by
selling less, but not adjusting price, hence the use of 'almost' above.
8in the case of a repeated game framework, quotas tend to provide more protection than
do tariffs. Indeed, there are at least 30 cases one could consider and every one of these
scenarios has increased protection yielding no decrease in price-marginal cost markups.
Conversely, liberalization, the theory predicts, will not lead to an increase in these markups.
The relative unanimity of the theory's predictions is welcome from the point of view of
empirical work. I will test what happened to mark-ups in several industries, and the
structural oligopoly model that is appropriate for one industry is almost surely wrong
for another. That the different models yield the same predictions greatly enhances the
interpretability of the results.
Given the theory's strong predictions about mark-ups and trade liberalization, the
next step is to derive an estimable equation that satisfies the constraints of the data and
is consistent with a fairly general structural model of static oligopoly.
The output of firm i in year is denoted qj1 and is a function of a jxl vector of variable
inputs, L, and capital, K. Firm output is given by:
=f(L,I'jt), (1)
whereis a firm and period specific multiplicative productivity shock. Allowing the
shock to vary over firms permits firm heterogeneity since for given inputs, some firms are
surely more productive than others, while letting the shock vary over time captures both
industry-wide shocks and other exogenous increases of output over time. (The latter is
sometimes labeled technical progress and modelled additively, but this method of sepa-
rately identifying productivity shocks and technical progress seems arbitrary and is hence
abandoned.) The function f may exhibit constant, increasing, or decreasing returns to
scale.
The productivity shock is assumed to follow a random walk with firm-specific drift. The
forecast error is assumed normally distributed with mean zero and variance i2.Hence,
=c,s_i +k1 + su; —N(0,a2) (2)
That the productivity shock enters (1) multiplicatively captures the idea that the extra
output produced in a good year, for example, is not independent of the level of inputs.
9An implication of the normally distributed forecast error is that for some very negative
draws of cj, q-t would become negative. I assume q,1 is bounded below at zero and for
large enough negative draws of cu, the firm simply closes shop and goes out of business.
The unexpected part of the productivity shock, c, is assumed to be comprised of two
parts. Specifically,
=A1 + Pit, (3)
whereE(A1) = = 0,E(A,A3) =aif i =sand analogously for ji.Thefirst
component of the disturbance, A1,isthe productivity shock to variable and quasi-fixed
factors. Note that it is only indexed by time and not by firm. This is an important
assumption, and its reasonableness depends crucially on the exact nature of the panel
data set. By indexing A1onlyby 1, I am assuming that all firms within a given 3 digit
industry in Istanbul, Turkey face the same productivity shock to variable factors in any
given year. For example, a fuel price increase or fall in raw material prices hits all firms
in the given industry. This assumption makes use of the detailed nature of the panel data
set. In other panel data sets, one across industry aggregates in the U.S. over time, for
example, the assumption is not plausible. PitIS thatcomponent of the productivity shock
that is idiosyncratic to firm i in year t and is assumed orthogonal to A1. In other words,
iu does not effect the choice of variable inputs. Firm idiosyncratic phenomenon captured
by Pitmightinclude being victimized by robbery or extortion, closing the plant for the
owner's daughter's wedding, and the like.
The component of the productivity shock that effects the productivity of the vector L11
and K11 will almost surely be correlated with how these factors change in response to the
shock. Therefore, E(A1, L-11 or Kmjg)0, so a component of the disturbance is no longer
orthogonal to the included right-hand side variables. This will prove to be an important
econometric concern and is discussed in section 5.
The first step in deriving an estimating equation is to take a first order Taylor series
approximation of qi,t1 around q11. This yields:
=u
[>i!_aL:i+ #J41KIz]+ f1tt1t. (4)whereis the first difference operator defined by x1 =— ,...,Itshould be
noted that a first order Taylor series approximation may be quite satisfactory if returns
to scale are more or less constant, but if returns to scale are dramatically increasing or
decreasing, the approximation is not precise.'2 There is nothing behavioral about (4); it
is just arithmetic. I turn now to the oligopolistic firm's profit maximization problem.
The timing of when managers learn the productivity shock is important. I assume
managers observe period 's productivity shock prior to setting inputs.13 Firm profits,
are given by:
= — — rmtKmjt, (5)
where p is the price of the homogenous good in period t, isthe price of factor
and rmt is the cost of capital.
The manager must choose the optimal mix of inputs and the optimal quantity of output.
Using discrete derivatives, profit maximization with respect to input L,1 implies:
wu = 1+ —,where
p,
= :Market Share,
(6) Qtpt =—— :Arc Elasticity of Demand, and
Qi
= :Conjectural Variations Parameter.
An analogous condition holds for capital. Equation (6) makes use of the assumption that
firms take input prices as given. As parameterized, 6 is set to one if firms play Nash in
12 Experiments estimating production functions without a capital input variable, since it is not
available, suggest that the constant returns to scale assumption is empirically quite reasonable for the
industries under study.
This is the assumption implicitly adopted in recent work in macroeconomics (see Robert Hall
(1988) as well as in the empirical industrial organization literature (see Bresnahan (1989). The alternative
assumption implies that managers maximize expected profits and in an oligopolistic set-up, this will involve
higher moments of the distribution of outcomes. This complicates estimation.
11quantities and zero if they play Nash in prices.'4
Profit maximization with respect to output levels implies:
(7)
fiwillbe treated as unobservable and will be estimated. It is especially convenient that
the market share, demand elasticity, and mode of market conduct are all gathered together
in (7), for they are each unobserved.'5 On the other hand, these unobservables will not be
separately identified when is estimated. Substituting (2), (3), (6), and (7) into (4) gives:
=it + + fi,(f + pit). (8)
Note that if (8) is divided by qi,, the terms within the brackets are multiplied and
divided by L,, and K1, respectively, and we use the approximation that=lnX,
one has an estimating equation along the lines of Hall (1988) and the many papers his
work has inspired. Advantages of (8) over the "Hall" approach, for the problem at hand,
include not requiring (unavailable) capital stock data, the absence of qj1 from the right
hand side of the equation (and the simultaneity bias that would entail), and requiring one
less approximation.
The imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis focuses on how the price—marginal
cost ratio changes with the imposition of trade liberalization. The myriad models investi-
gating trade policy and domestic market power in a homogenous product domestic industry
predict that in imperfectly competitive industries, this ratio falls with trade liberalization.
Since the shift in trade policy that gave rise to import liberalization occurred in 1984, (8)
is rewritten as:
For anice discussion of why this sort of parameterization is as theoretically misguided as it is
empirically useful, see Helpman and Krugman, chapter 8.
Market share is unobserved since while I have data on most firms, I do not have data on every
firm. Also, total imports by industry code are not available for every year of the sample.




/38586,17 !'.!ILLLI7 + + +/211),
where the independent variables are interacted with the appropriate period dummies.
isthe price marginal cost ratio prior to the liberalization, while /3S556,7isthe markup
after liberalization. Equation (9) is basis for the estimating equation, and the imports-
as-market-discipline hypothesis can be stated as 1384,7> 138586,ii.In the next section,
estimation of the /37'S is discussed.
5. Econometric Concerns
The estimating equation, (9), is linear in the price-marginal cost ratio, fl...Itis non-
linear in changes in input levels, input prices, and output price, but these are all data.
Ordinary least squares (OLS), though, would be inappropriate. Four very straightforward
econometric concerns merit brief discussion. The first pertains to the probable correlation
between the period-specific random effect, A7, and the included independent variables.
The economics of the situation strongly suggest that productivity shocks to variable
factors, which are observed by managers prior to setting levels of inputs, will not be
independent of changes in outputs. That is, in a good year, a large positive A will lead
managers to use more of an input. Hence, E(A, LL,7 or LKmit)0. OLS in the
presence of this non-independence gives biased estimates. Abbott, Griliches, and Hausman
(1989) have shown that in this particular situation, OLS estimates are upwardly biased.
The ideal solution would be to find firm-level instruments that cause changes in inputs but
are uncorrelated with the productivity shock. This is a tall order to fill. Likely and available
candidates for instruments are lagged values of LsL117 and Kmitandfirm-specific wages.
(Other input prices, while assumed exogenous, do not vary across firms.) These potential
instruments present serious problems. First, since the estimating equation is already in
first-differences and the panel consists of only 4 years, using lagged variables as instruments
decreases the degrees of freedom by a third. More importantly, the pre-liberalization mark-
ups would not be estimable. Second, if productivity shocks are random (net of the drift
13term k1) as posited, there is no economic reason to believe that first-differences in inputs
should be serially correlated. Hence, even in the absence of the degrees of freedom issue,
the fit of these instrument is likely to be quite poor)6
Hausman and Taylor (1981) have shown that when the random effect is correlated
with the included independent variables, modelling the random effect as a fixed effect
yields consistent and unbiased, albeit inefficient parameter estimates. Given the lack of
appropriate instruments, this approach is adopted, and A is modelled as a time period
fixed effect. Since the estimated variance-covariance matrix of parameter estimates will
not achieve its minimum bound, hypothesis tests will he too strong. For the problem at
hand, hypothesis tests will address whetherchanges over time and whether levels of fl
aresignificantly different from one. The inefficiency of my estimates will, for given data,
make it harder to accept that fii 'a are significantly different from year to year and easier
to accept that they are equal to one.
A second econometric issue arises due to the presence of price, p, as a non-linear coin-
pooeot of the independent variable. Since the markets under investigation are potentially
oligopolistic, any one firm might affect the industry-wide price. If, for example, p was
positive, output would be higher, and this might lead to a lower price for all firms. Like
the previously discussed econometric issue, an instrumental variables approach will solve
the problem. Unlike with the first econometric issue, instruments are plentiful because
price is only indexed by time. Firm-level instruments are not required. Letting X denote
the independent variable in (8), where,
=1 +
rmtAKmit)
note that Pt is the only endogenous variable entering X0. Wages and capital costs are
taken as exogenous by any single firm, and changes in inputs are, after the inclusion of
A, orthogonal to the disturbance. Therefore the term (EJ... + is
15 The difficulty in finding appropriate instruments at the firm level is demonstrated by Harrison who
finds that instrumental variables (IV) estimates of are greater than OLS estimates when, if instruments
were appropriate, the IV estimates should be smaller. The same dLffieolty is evidenced in Hall who uses
industry aggregated data. This is diseussed in Abbott, Griliches, and Hausman.
14itself exogenous. This term is included as an instrument for X.. The instrument for p
should be correlated with price and independent of industry-specific productivity shocks.
The economy-wide wholesale price index for Turkey is used to instrument for Pt.
A third econometric issue concerns the disturbance term, fg(A, + lZd).Dueto the
presence of theterm, the disturbance is likely to be heteroskedastic. f,, is the output
of firm i in year t in the absence of any productivity shock. As such, it is unobservable,
but it is reasonable to suppose that the composite disturbance term will be larger for
bigger firms. While the White correction will give a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix, it will not necessarily be efficient. Since theory dictates the form of
the heteroskedasticity, weighted least squares is employed. It is assumed that the variance
of the disturbance is proportional to labor expenditures. While this is not going to be
an exact correction, it will capture the idea that the disturbance has greater variance for
larger firms.'7
The final econometric issue concerns the imposition of prior identifying restrictions on
..t.Aswritten in (8), the price—marginal cost ratio is indexed by both firm and period.
This implies negative degrees of freedom and is of course econometrically infeasible. Some
prior restrictions are necessary. This issue does not arise, by assumption, in the theoretical
models of trade policy and oligopoly. There, a symmetric domestic market structure with
n identical firms is the standard assumption. In that case, all domestic firms have, by
construction, identical mark-ups. In the real world, though, the size distribution of firms
is not uniform.
One oft-used approach is to assume that all firms have the same mark-up.'8 A pos-
sible drawback to this approach is its theoretical implication that, as seen in (7), larger
firms (bigger Sit)actmore competitively (smaller 6.). The advantage of this approach
is that despite its theoretical inelegance, it frequently fits the data much better than the
Another implementationof weighted leastsquares frequently used in a panel context is to
empirically correct for the heteroskedasticity by dividing through by the firm-specific variance of the
disturbance, o.. This correction is not used here because it is hard to believe that three observations will
yield a precise estimate of e.
This is the approach implicitly adopted by Abbott, Hausman, and Griliches, Harrison, Hall (in
a macroeconomic context), and the many researchers who estimate cost functions with data from more
titan one firm. -
15usual alternative. That alternative is to assume cx ante that firms play Cournot. This im-
plies, plausibly enough, that firms with larger market shares have lower costs and higher
markups. This approach sits well with the theory and, in this case, quite poorly with
the data. A middle-of-the-road approach is to let markups vary non-linearly with firm
size and not impose the relation between firm size and mark-ups except to require that
larger markups are associated with larger market shares. I experimented with both this
approach and the approach imposing Cournot behavior and consistently obtained nonsen-
sical results and a very poor fit. Entire industries were pricing at a fraction of marginal
cost. Finally, I experimented with estimating markups for the six largest firms separate
from the other firms and seeing if patterns emerged. None did, and, again, the data seem
to imply markups unrelated to firm size. Hence, I assume markups are constant across
firms in a given period so=f9.
6. Results and Interpretation
Equation (9) was estimated separately for each industry using the firm-level panel
data described in section 3. The results are summarized in Table 4. There we see that
estimated markups are in general quite precisely estimated. Almost all of the 22 markups
are quite precisely estimated as the standard errors are in general small relative to the
estimates. This is especially striking since the estimated standard errors are inflated due
to the treatment of the random effect as a fixed effect. The precision of the estimates is
especially useful, for it makes tests of changes in markups, discussed below, much more
powerful.
There are two economic, as opposed to econometric, reasons to believe that the es-
timated markups in Table 4 are not the true markups in Turkish manufacturing from
1983-86. First, the industry panels are balanced and do not contain information on firms
that may have entered or, more importantly, exited during the period spanning the data.
If firm level data on these firms were available, the selectivity bias could be corrected. In
the absence of this data, we can sign the bias. If we make the very plausible assumption
that it was the less efficient firms that exited (P <<IttC), then excluding these firms
from the sample gives rise to estimated markups higher than the true markups.
16On the other hand, there is an important reason to believe that the estimated markups
are lower than the true markups. Firms, when confronted with a manufacturing census
form, may understate their profitability. Turkish firms may not, perhaps with good reason,
trust the wall of confidentiality that separates the census bureau from the internal revenue
service in most developed countries. To the extent that this is the case, firms will tend to
understate revenues and/or overstate costs. The relative importance of these two possibly
offsetting biases is unknown.
With these possible biases in mind, we turn to discussion of the magnitudes of the
markups. An economically insightful way to interpret the markups is to ask whether
prices equalled, exceeded, or were less than marginal costs. The null hypothesis is that
prices equalled marginal costs (f31.0) and an f-test tests this hypothesis. The results of
these tests are presented in Table 5.
Prior to the change in trade policy, six industries were pricing at marginal cost, three
above marginal cost, and two below marginal cost. Of the three industries pricing above
marginal cost, markups are moderate for two (ISICs 352 and 383) where they are 1.32
and 1.50 respectively. Prior to liberalization, the estimated markup in ISIC 361, the
manufacture of pottery, earthenware, and china, is 5.39. This is quite large. This is
an industry, though, in which marginal costs are probably quite low. In many plants,
machines produce the output using inputs such as sand and clay which are themselves
very inexpensive. This is also the industry in which markups are least precisely estimated.
In the steel and iron (ISIC 371) and non-electrical machinery (ISIC 382) industries,
estimated marginal costs exceed prices prior to the liberalization. Were the estimated
ratios a long-run equilibrium instead of just a snapshot in time, the estimates would not
be plausible. As estimated one-period behavior, though, they are more plausible. In the
presence of significant start-up costs, firms may well decide to endure a loss if they believe
it to be temporary. This may be the case in the machinery industry where the estimated
price—marginal cost ratio is .848. This ratio, while low, is credible. The very low pre-
liberalization price—marginal cost ratio of .620 for the steel industry is probably explained
by the fact that this industry, more than any other industry in Turkish manufacturing, is
government controlled. In 1981, the most recent year for which data is readily available,
1758.7% of the value added in this industry was produced by government owned plants.'9
The profit maximizing framework employed in section 4 may be especially inappropriate
for this particular industry.
After the trade liberalization, another industry (ISIC 372) has an estimated price-
marginal cost ratio less than one. This is not inconsistent with the notion that in the
presence of adjustment costs and sunk costs, a firm may lose money while it adapts to the
new trading environment. It should be noted, though, that while this explanation probably
has some real world relevance, it is an explanation that lies outside of the framework of
the simple oligopoly model that generated the estimating equation.
Tables 4 and 5 addressed the issue of marginal cost pricing in import-competing Turkish
manufacturing. Those tables do not, though, directly address the imports-as-market-
discipline hypothesis. Recall that the hypothesis states that in imperfectly competitive,
import-competing industries, trade liberalization gives rise to lower price-marginal cost
ratios. Conversely, in industries in which protection increased, price-marginal cost ratios
should either increase if the protection affords domestic firms market power or stay the
same (at P =IIIC)if there is sufficient domestic competition. Are these simple and
theoretically robust insights supported by the data? Table 6 addresses this question.
Table 6 summarizes what happened to the level of protection in the 1984 import policy
shift and what happened to price-marginal cost ratios when the policy shifted. It is helpful
to divide the industries into three groups. The first group is comprised of imperfectly com-
petitive industries in which trade was liberalized (protection decreased.) Using the results
in Table 5 to determine which industries are imperfectly competitive prior to liberalization,
we see this first group consists of three industries—ISICs 352, 361, and 383. The second
group is comprised of the two industries (ISICs 384 and 385) that experienced an increase
in the level of protection. The third group is comprised of industries which priced at or be-
low marginal coat and experienced trade liberalization. The imports-as-market-discipline
hypothesis concerns only the first two groups. It does not pertain to industries which are,
prior to liberalization, already perfectly competitive. In those industries, there is nothing
for imports to discipline. I discuss each group in turn.
See Yagcifor details.
18The imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis contends that firms in the first group of
industries, those that were imperfectly competitive prior to liberalization, should experi-
ence a decline in markups with the onset of the liberalization. In Table 6, we see that all
three industries in this group did indeed experience such a decline. In two of the three
industries, the decline was statistically significant at the 90% level. The hypothesis con-
tends that firms in the second group of industries, those that experienced an increase in
protection, should see price-marginal cost ratios either increase or remain at 1.0. The
hypothesis is accepted for both industries in the second group. In ISIC 384, markups
increased significantly, while in ISIC 385, they also increased, but not significantly and we
cannot reject marginal cost pricing post-protection. I conclude that for the Turkish case,
the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis does indeed find support in the data. All five
of the industries to which the hypothesis is relevant experienced changes in markups con-
sistent with the theory. In only one of the five, ISIC 352, was the change not statistically
significant.2°
Although the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis does not make predictions about
the third group of industries, those that priced at marginal cost prior to liberalization,
the results are nonetheless worth noting. The theory of commercial policy with perfect
competition suggests that, in the absence of adjustment costs, firms will continue to price
at marginal cost after a trade liberalization and the rents to fixed factors decline. In
Table 6, we see that in three of the perfectly competitive industries, ISICs 351, 371, and
372, there was no significant change in price-marginal cost ratios. In ISIC 382, the ratio
declined, while in ISICs 341 and 381 they increased.
7. Summary
That international competition might act to curtail domestic market power is an old,
theoetica1ly robust, and very simple insight. It is also a very important one. It is a part of
any discussion of the welfare effects of trade policy with imperfect competition. It is also an
20 Issues ofstatisticalsignificancedo not apply toISIC 385 wherearesult of no significant change is
theoretically consistent. In that industry, I conclude domestic competition alone was sufficient to prevent
oligopolistic behavior after the Imposition of protection.
19oft-used argument in antitrust investigations. Since the insight is really about firms,there
is an argument to be made for confronting the theory with firm-level data. The 1984 Import
Program implemented by Turkey provides an excellent natural experiment with which to
test the theory. The firm-level Turkish manufacturing census, which was collected annually
(as opposed to every five years in many other countries) provides the appropriate data.
Using a methodology tailored to the constraints of the data set, the imports-as-market-
discipline hypothesis was tested. In all five industries that were relevant, the hypothesis
was supported by the data.
The theoretical insights that were tested in this paper are very straightforward. There
remains a burgeoning theoretical literature on trade policy and market structure that has
yet to be econometrically tested. The relative success of this first step will hopefully
motivate testing of more elaborate theoretical findings.
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22Data Appendix
Data are from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics 1983-1986 manufacturing census
of Istanbul tapes.
The variable inputs that comprise the elements of L,1, as discussed in the text, are
labor, raw materials and other purchased inputs, and fuel. Exact variable definitions for
these quantities and their prices are as follows.
Labor: I sum the following: Male and female high level technical personnel, Male and
female medium level technical personnel, male and female foremen, and male and female
workers. The wage variable is constructed by dividing annual daily wages and overtime by
the above sum.
Raw materials and other purchased inputs: Expenditures on raw materials, primary
inputs, packaging, and other purchased variable inputs are summed. This sum is divided
by a three digit industry-specific material input price to obtain the quantity variable.
Fuel: Total fuel costs are divided by the manufacturing energy price index.
The variable K,m is constructed by summing the following variables: Newly purchased
or imported machinery, newly purchased or imported transportation vehicles, newly pur-
chased or imported buildings, payment in the survey year made to the one who constructs
buildings for the firm, expenditures made to another party to improve and upgrade the ca-
pacity of fixed capital of the firm, newly produced machinery, transportation, and buildings
by the firm itself, the firm's own expenditures to improve and upgrade the capacity of the
fixed capital, second had purchases of machinery, transportation vehicles, buildings, and
land, expenditures for installing fixed capital, project research expenditures for fixed cap-
ital, office equipment, and depreciation of machinery transportation and buildings. From
this, I subtract any sales of fixed capital.
That concludes the description of the input variables used in estimation. The output
variable is constructed as follows. Output is given by the Gross Value of Output variable
on the tape. This variable is total sales revenues adjusted for changes in the inventories
of semi- and finished products. These amounts are then divided b the three digit output
price to give quantities.
Exact variable codes are available on request. All estimation was done using version
3.10 of RATS386 on a Zenith 386 desktop computer with 8 megabytes of RAM.
23TABLE 1
Importing Turkish Industries in 1984
ISICCategory Title 1984 Trade Balance
in US$1000
341 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products -63,497
351 Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals -1,333,890
352 Manufacture of Other Chemical Products -95,237
361 Manufacture of Pottery, China, Earthenware -1,065
371 Iron and Steel Basic Industries -135,143
372 Non-ferrous metal Basic Industries -141,452
381 Manufacture of Metal Products Except Machinery -102,659
382 Manufacture of Machinery Except Electrical -1,279,370
383 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery -486,604
384 Manufacture of Transport Equipment -450,444
385 Manufacture of Scientific Equipment, etc. -120,300
Source: CECTP, The World Bank.TABLE 2
Changes in Import Protection in 1984
ISIC Estimated Percentage of Estimated Overall Estimated Change
Quantitative Restrictions Tariff Change in Protection
Eliminated
341 78.5 -18.9 Decrease
351 81.8 -3.8 Decrease
352 81.8 -3.8 Decrease
361 19.6 -2.6 Decrease
371 0.1 3.2 Decrease
372 -2.2 -27.4 Decrease
381 6.5 -2.7 Decrease
382 11.9 -0.1 Decrease
383 60.2 -14.9 Decrease
384 14.3 3.8 Increase
385 100.0 20.5 Increase
Source: Adapted from Baysen and Blitzer in Aricanli and Rodrik (1990).TABLE 3
Industry Structure











385 18 .727TABLE 4
Estimated Price-Marginal Cost Ratios
ISIC /384 /385,86 R2
341 .625' 2.17' .77
(.268) (.143)
351 1.05' 1.05' .75
(.103) (.084)
352 1.32' 1.25' .64
(.087) (.078)
361 5.39' 1.06 .63
(.829) (.673)
371 .620' .746' .26
(.151) (.113)
372 .754' .455' .22
(.211) (.201)
381 .822' 1.27' .63
(.128) (.048)
382 .848' .427' .36
(.069) (.092)
383 1.50' 1.14' .28
(.189) (.126)
384 .717' 1.35' .67
(.147) (.069)
385 .782' 1.15' .48
(.270) (.238)
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. An asterisk indicates signifi-
cance at the 95 % level.TABLE 5














Notes: These test results are based on accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis at
the 95 percent significaiice level.TABLE 6
Changes in Protection and Mark-ups
ISIC Protection Mark-ups F-test Sig. Level
Imperfectly competitive industries in which trade was liberalized.
352 Decreased Decreased .54
361 Decreased Decreased .00
383 Decreased Decreased .10
Industries in which protectionincreased.
384 Increased Increased .00
385 Increased Increased .31
Perfectly competitive industries in which trade was liberalized.
341 Decreased Increased .00
351 Decreased No Change .98
371 Decreased Increased .50
372 Decreased Decreased .31
381 Decreased Increased .00
382 Decreased Decreased .00
Notes: The significance of the f-test is such that an entry of .01, for example, would
indicate rejecting that the pre- and post-liberalization markups are equal at the 99% level.
Hence, entries of .00 -.10in the last column indicate that the shift in markups is significant
at the 90% level or higher.